2005-ben látott napvlágot Martin Mevius fiatal holland történész "Agents of Moscow. The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953" c. könyve, amelyben végigköveti a Rákosi vezetés igazodását a szovjet vonalhoz, amikor a Szovjetunió megtámadása után az európai kommunista pártok irányt váltottak és a szocialista forradalom helyett a nemzeti felszabadítás programját írják zászlaikra.
A nemzeti szimbólumok és rétorika felvállalása mellett ez magával hozta a testvérpártok közti súrlódásokat, konfliktusokat is, amelyekben a szovjetekre hárult a döntőbíró szerepe. Az alábbiakban a könyv magyar-szlovák vonzatait ismertetjük.
A szerző legfőbb erénye a forrás választás. Témánkban hiteles felvidéki forrásmunkákat (Janics, Vadkerty) használ, és ezek adatait magyar levéltárak dokumentumaival valamint egy 1990-után kiadott szovjet forrásmű adataival bővíti.
A Kossuth Rádió
A 1941. június 21-i német támadást követöen a külföldre sugárzó Komintern Rádió ("InoRadio") feladatául kapta, hogy növelje adásainak hatékonyságát és az internacionalista vonalról váltson nemzeti-hazafias hangvételre. A moszkvai magyar emigráció vezetői ennek érdekében egy titkos nemzeti adót javasoltak létrehozni az időközben alakult "Szabad Németország" mintájára. A kérést Dimitrov július 1-én terjesztette fel Molotovnak és Berijának, akik július 15-én döntöttek a titkos rádióadó létrehozásáról, amely általános nemzeti-náciellenes vonalat kellett hogy képviseljen. A rádióadó szeptember végétől sugárzott "Kossuth Rádió" néven és a hallgatókban azt a benyomást kellett keltenie, hogy híradását Magyarországon szerkesztik. Ugyanabban az időben a Komintern más nemzeti szekciói is indítottak hasonló rádió adásokat -- a cseh "Za národní osvobození" mellett a szlovák "Za slobodné Slovensko" is.
A magyar adás igazgatója Rákosi Mátyás lett, főszerkesztője a főideológus Révai József. Szerkesztőként további parttisztségviselők dolgoztak: Farkas Mihály, az Ifjúsági Komintern volt vezetője, a Rákosival együtt szabadult Vas Zoltán újságíró, a csehszlovákiai magyar Nógrádi Sándor, Szántó Rezsö ügyvéd és újságíró, és bátyja Zoltán, Friss István közgazdász, Nagy Imre mezőgazdász, Hay László közgazdász és a spanyol polgárháború veteránja Münnich Ferenc. Az adások szerkesztésébe beleszólt a Komintern-appatcsik Gerő Ernő is.
A magyarok kitoloncolásának terve Csehszlovákiából (1945 márc.-aug.)
A csehszlovák kommunista párt a háború alatt azonos nacionalista politikát tette mint a magyar. A Csehszlovákiában elő magyar kisebbséget - a többi cseh párthoz hasonlóan - "ötödik hadoszlopnak" tekintette, amelyet a szudéta-németekhez hasonló arányban terheli a felelősség Csehszlovákia szétveréséért 1938-ban. A csehszlovák kommunisták sok szempontból jobb alkupozícióban voltak Sztálinnál mint Rákosiék: a csehszlovák kommunista párt tömegtámogatottsággal rendelkezett odahaza, ismert volt a Prágában a szovjetekkel szemben megnyilvánuló szimpátia. Gottwaldék bírták Sztálin támogatását a magyar kisebbséggel szembeni kampányukban.
Gottwald Beneš-el 1943 decemberében egyeztetett:
Benes negotiated with leaders of the Czechoslovak party in December 1943. In principle they agreed on treating the Hungarians in Slovakia the same as Germans, and put the exchange of Hungarians with Slovaks living in Hungary on the agenda.[32: Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 60.]
Gottwald javaslatára került szóba a lakosságcsere [hivatkozás Vadkerty 209], mivel a kiűzendő magyarok körében nagy volt a kommunista párt támogatottsága:
Initially, however, the Czechoslovak communists had been apprehensive about the expulsions, especially as they had a large base of support among Hungarians in Slovakia, which is why Gottwald proposed a population exchange rather than outright expulsion.[33: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizacioig, 209.]
Az idő előrehaladtával a magyarok deportációjának terve egyre elfogadottabbá vált a csehszl. kommunista emigráció körében:
As the war progressed, the Czech communist emigres became more comfortable with the idea of deportations. Gottwald demanded an ethnically pure Czechoslovak state in a speech on u May 1944, and by August 1944 both the London and the Moscow exiles were united in
demanding a democratic, Slav national state.[34: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizacioig, 209.]
1944 szeptemberében a szlovák kommunisták úgy gondolták, hogy a magyarok élűzését a Vörös hadsereg segítségével fogják megvalósítani:
In September 1944, the Slovak Communist Party insisted that 'the Germans and the Hungarians' would be driven out of Slovak territory Svith the help of the Red Army'.[35: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizacioig, 313.][Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 84.]
A szeptemberben kirobbant szlovák felkelés magyarellenessége az első napoktól világos volt:
The Slovak revolt of September 1944 was anti-Hungarian from the beginning. Spontaneously set up Hungarian National Committees were disbanded as soon as an area was put under Slovak control and Hungarian schools were closed. The revolt was national and not class based, as Hungarian workers were considered enemies rather than allies.[36: Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, 91.]
A moszkvai magyar emigráció a csehszlovákiai magyar kérddéssel 1944 őszén kezdett foglalkozni, a szlovák elvtársak iránt maximális jóindulatot tanúsítva:
The czechoslovak plans for resettlement of Hungarians were only discussed in passing at the autumn 1944 meetings, at which Erno Gero had stated that it could not be opposed, because it would 'conflict with the SU\ As an alternative, it was argued that the party should stress the rights of the Hungarians rather than territory, because it was impossible to draw ethnic borders anyway. The MKP would also call for solidarity for the freedom of the neighbouring peoples. Bela Fogarasi demanded the creation of a 'principled line' to counter the hatred created
by Horthy, aimed at cooperation with the Slovaks. [37: PIL 742/8, 1-11; PIL 677.1/13, 13-22]
Ez azonban nem talált kellö fogadtatásra:
He was wildly optimistic if he thought the Slovaks would reciprocate any goodwill. The atmosphere in Slovakia was violently anti-Hungarian, and newly established Slovak authorities had already started deporting Hungarians over the border, even before the government had firmly established a policy. [38: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizdcioig, 211.]
Moszkvában tisztában voltak vele, mi folyik Szlovákiában a magyarokkal:
The head of the Seventh Department, Burtsev, reported that Hungarians did not speak their own language out of fear of losing their jobs, in some places had been compelled to wear the letter "M" (for Magyar) on their arms, Hungarian schools were closed, and the tone of both the Czech and Slovak press was aggressively anti-Hungarian, including the central party newspaper of the Slovak Communist Party, Pravda.) [40: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktory 225—8.]
By contrast, there was no Hungarian press available, and all public manifestations of Hungarian cultural life were stifled. Even speaking Hungarian in the streets could lead to censure by Slovak soldiers. The Hungarians lost political rights, and even those who retained their Czechoslovak citizenship were discriminated against. Hungarians were, for instance, not allowed to become members of the National Committees in Slovakia. Where such committees had been set up by Hungarians in Hungarian areas, they were later dissolved.
[41: PIL 274.7/309, 114-16.]
Burtsev noted the 'activization of chauvinist elements': in Levice, the Czechoslovak garrison commander ordered the posting of anti-Hungarian slogans such as 'Slovaks, speak loudly' and 'We are in our home, we are master' [42: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktory 224—6.]
A szlovák kommunista párt, amelynek háború elötti tagságának nagy részét magyarok alkották, most szlovák nemzeti karakterét bizonyitandó, vad támadásokba kezdett a magyarok ellen:
Similarly to the MKP's attitude towards the Swabians, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSC) considered the Hungarians collectively responsible for the destruction caused by the war. While a large majority of the Slovak Communist Party before 1938 had been Hungarian, the KSC now concluded that 95 per cent of the Hungarian minority was 'reactionary and nationalist. [43: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizdcioig. 199]
The large pre-war Hungarian membership of the Slovak Communist Party almost precluded a believable Slovak national character for the party, which made the communist attack on the Hungarians all the more ferocious. The KSC halted the intake of new Hungarian members. In theory the Central Committee checked the old party members' past on an individual basis, [44: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. 224-6.] but in public the KSC dubbed Hungarians 'Fascists' who would all have to be expelled from the party. For instance, at the Slovak party's conference of 20-1 May 1945 the party concluded that in Hungarian areas 'the enemy has ended up in the party, but these Fascists have to be transported to Hungary'. [45: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizdeioig, 199.]
A tömegpártá vállás folyamata egyfelöl, a magyar párttagok kizárása másfelöl, erösítette a párt szlovák jellegét. Az új párttagok egy része a volt Hlinka-féle néppártból verbuválódott:
In Slovakia, the party underwent a similar transformation into a mass party to the MKP in Hungary, so that the intake of Slovak members further diluted the Hungarian membership.
The debatable wartime activities of many new Slovak members only strengthened the anti-Hungarian character of the Slovak Communist Party. According to a report by the MKP, in Dunajska Streda (Dunaszerdahely) the party leadership was mostly middle class in background, and in Rimavska Subota (Rimaszombat), 70 per cent of the members of the Slovak Communist Party had a past in the extreme nationalist Hlinka guard." [46: MOL 276.68/14, 4-9.]
A szlovák felkelésben felnött új vezetögárda erösen nacionalista beállítású volt és a régi magyar káderek kiszorítását tüzte ki célul:
A prominent leader of the Slovak communists, Husak, was known for his hatred of Hungarians, and the communist chairman of the Slovak National Council, Smidke, used to declare at meetings that he was first a Slovak, and only then a communist. [47: MOL 276.65/202, 1-10.]
Hungarian activists who remained in the party were gradually removed from their posts, despite having suffered years of persecution at the hands of the Hungarian authorities. Jozsef Fabry, for instance, had been a member of the communist party since 1928 and party secretary since 1934, he had been imprisoned in jail and concentration camp for thirty-three months, and after that was decorated for his contribution to the Slovak partisan struggle. He was sacked regardless. Comparable events occurred in the labour movement. [48: PIL 274.7/309, 114-16]
Within the parties and the unions, the use of the Hungarian language was prohibited, even when the majority of the members were Hungarians who did not understand Slovak at all, because, according to the communist president of the Kosice district National Committee, it endangered the 'Slovakness' of the Slovak Communist Party.[49: Vadkerty, Kitelepitesetol a reszlovakizdcioig, 319.]
At a local conference in the Galanta district, twenty-five out of the forty delegates were not able to understand Slovak, but were nevertheless forbidden to use Hungarian, and in the township of Seliska the president of the Party Committee had forbidden the use of Hungarian despite the majority of the delegates being Hungarian.[50: PIL 274.7/300 114-16.]
Sometimes, the Hungarians were ignored even if they did speak Slovak: at a regional conference in Bratislava none of the eighty Hungarian delegates had been allowed to speak at all.[51: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. 224—6.]
Hungarian communists were not permitted to turn their eyes to Hungary: Rakosi protested to Dimitrov that the local party secretary of Lucenec had forbidden Hungarian party members to attend a speech by Rakosi in Salgotarjan on the Slovak border.[52: PIL 274-10/38, 50-8.]
Hungarian communist grievances went unheard in Slovakia, so they complained to Rakosi that 'certainly the fate of us Hungarians, whether communists or not, is terrible, our oppression is greater than in the old Czechoslovak Republic.[53: PIL 274.10/51, 82.]
The situation was so bad that Rakosi was having trouble restraining Hungarian communists in Slovakia, who were producing Hungarian pamphlets and desired the publication of an illegal party newspaper to put forward their case.[54: PIL274.1o/38, 72-81.]
A szerzö aláhúzza, hogy míg a Komintern eredetileg a nemzetköziséget és a nemzetek eggyüttmüködését tüzte ki céljául, az egyes szekciók nemzeti programokkal való felvértezése belsö konfliktusokhoz vezetett. A szlovák kommunisták a magyarellenes támadásokat a nemzeti karakterük hangsúlyozásával magyarázták:
While the Comintern's 'national policy' had originally been devised to improve the national credentials of the individual sections, it now provoked a damaging conflict between two communist parties. The Slovak party explained its attitude towards the Hungarian communists by the fact that it 'otherwise could not operate as a national party'.[55: PIL 274.10/13-17.]
The Slovak communist national image was improved by its attacks on the Hungarians...
Rákosi több levélben is kérte Dimitrov segítségét az ügyben [57: PIL 274.10/38,95-7.], [58: PIL 274.10/38, 13-17.] és néhány jel utal rá, hogy utóbbi az üggyel foglalkozott is és kikérte a szovjet hatóságok álláspontját a Szlovákiában uralkodó állapotokhoz[59: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. 224-6.]. Rákosi találkozni szeretett volna prágai és pozsonyi elvtársaival, de elöbb Dimitrov intervencióját szerette volna elérni [60,61: PIL274.10/.A75-81.]. Végül is Rákosi június 23-án találkozott Moszkvában Dimitrovval, ahol terítéken volt a Szlovákiai kérdés, de elörelépés nem történt [62: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetsbiy faktor, i. 195-204 n. 3.] A magzar kommunista vezér megütközéssel fogadta Fierlinger szavait, hogy a magyarellenes kampányukhoz a csehek megkapták Sztálin jóváhagyását [63: PIL 274.10/38, 95—7.][64: Rakosi, Visszaemlekezesek 591—2.]. Ekkor már Molotov beszélt Fierlingerrel arról, hogy mettöl-meddig számíthatnak a szovjet támogatásra ez ügyben, de erröl a megbeszélésröl Rákosinak nem volt tudomása [65: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. 174—82.]
Bármennyire is elszerette volna kerülni a Rákosi vezetés a konfliktust Moszvával és Prágával, miután elkezdödött a magyarok kitoloncolása Felvidékröl, nem maradhattak paszívak. [66: PIL 274.10/38,95-7.]
1945. június végén találkozott a két párt vezetösége Prágában. A magyar tiltakozásra Gottwald azzal válaszolt, hogy a dolog immár túl messzire jutott, mintsem hogy presztízsveszteség nélkül ki lehessen hátralni belöle:
According to Rakosi, Kopecky in particular put forward a hard line: 'In the Presidium Comrade Kopecky was very aggressive against us and alleged that our request in fact was the continuation of Hungarian chauvinist revisionist propaganda and the theory of the holy crown of St Stephen. During the deliberations, the 'national line' of the Comintern was referred to explicitly by the Czechoslovaks. Gottwald justified the hard line of the Czech party by claiming that the Comintern had been dissolved because 'the national aspirations of the individual sections were no longer compatible with each other.' He then, according to Rakosi, made a proposal that was a logically consistent solution to the clashing national policies of two communist parties: 'To bridge our difficulties, Comrade Gottwald proposed that we should calmly attack Czechoslovakia and even the Communist Party because of this policy.'[67: PIL 274.10/38, 101— 3.]
A magyarok deportálásának kérdése végül is a Potsdami konferencián dölt el, amikor a nagyhatalmak - a Szovjetúnió kivételével - elutasították a csehszlovák követelést. A szerzö Rákosi eröfeszítéseit nem tartja túl eredményeseknek:
Rakosi's pleas probably only had very minor effects—the reports from the Seventh Department suggest that they at least prompted Dimitrov to make some investigations of his own—but on the whole the Soviet Union supported the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Yet it was not unequivocally positive to them either, as they were compelled to support the annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine, and local Red Army commanders were known to intervene in too
extreme displays of Slovak anti-Hungarian 'chauvinism'. [75: PIL 274.7/309, 114-16.]
A csehszlovák-magyar lakosságcsere (1946 feb. - 1948)
1945 telén többször találkoztak a két ország küldöttségei a lakosságcsere kérdésében. [81: Lazar, Csehszlovák-magyar tárgyalások, 120—64.] Majd 1946 januárjában Gero, Revai, és Apro Antal a szlovák kommunista párt vezetöségével tárgyalt [82]
Végül is megszületett a kétoldalú szerzödés, amelyet 1946 február 27-én írtak alá.:
The two governments finally came to an agreement on 27 February 1946, which allowed
Czechoslovakia to deport as many Hungarians as it could entice Slovaks to emigrate voluntarily from Hungary to Slovakia. The solution was especially unsatisfactory to the Slovaks. As only 105,000 Slovaks lived in Hungary compared to the 650,000 Hungarians in Slovakia, they would never be able to create the pure Slovak state they desired. Consequently,
they kept pushing with the Allies for the deportation of all Hungarians. The bilateral agreement with Hungary gave the Czechoslovaks the right to recruit volunteers for resettlement in Slovakia. Under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Resettlement Committee (CRC), the first Slovak propaganda committees started to do their work in Hungary in March 1946.
Az áttelepítési bizottság muunkájáról:
Complaints about the Slovaks soon piled in. In Bukkszentkereszt they apparently depicted Slovakia as such a 'land of milk and honey' that even non-Slovak Hungarians signed up for voluntary emigration to Slovakia.
The author of a letter to Rakosi estimated that out of the 3,000 people in the district, 60 per cent of them MKP members, 98 per cent would leave the country. The propaganda committees were also accused of threatening the Slovaks that if they did not leave voluntarily now, they would later be forcibly deported with 50 kg of luggage. [83: PIL 274.10/52, 8—10.]
The activities of the CRC immediately reflected badly on the MKP. The CRC employed the mainly communist members of the left-wing Slovak Antifascist Committee, which made communists seem the main instigators of the population transfer.[84: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a rcszlovakizdcioig, ii. 25]
On top of this, commencing with Viliam Siroky at a mass meeting in Bekes, prominent Slovak communists came to Hungary to agitate in favour of the population exchange, which in Rakosi's words 'the reaction obviously noticed and was not ashamed to exploit'.[85: Rakosi, I isszaemlekezesek, i. 265.]
Rumours that MKP party members aided the work of the CRC and had carried the Czechoslovak flag had proven untrue, even though some 'Slovak elements' within the party had volunteered.[86: 274.4/I23, 11-14.]
Rákosit 1946 április 1-én fogadta Sztálin, ahol - Rákosi állítása szerint - bátorítást kapott a csehszlovákok elleni keményebb fellépésre:
Rakosi complained about the population exchange, and warned that the expulsion of all Hungarians from Slovakia, as advocated by Benes, would turn out to be a great burden on the young democracy and cause a 'chauvinist wave', with the communists ending up being held responsible... Stalin now apparently gave permission to the MKP to pursue a harder line against the Czechoslovaks. According to Rakosi, Stalin told him, 'you should correctly carry out the population exchange, but otherwise take a strong line, of course in a communist manner, against the persecution of the Slovak Hungarians. The communist party is the party of Hungarian patriots, and naturally cannot keep silent when they are persecuting the Hungarians next door.'[87: Rakosi, Visszaemlekezesek, ii. 265.]
1946 április közepén Sztálin fogadta Nagy Ferenc miniszterelnököt, ahol szintén szóba került a lakosságcsere, mivel szlovák félröl továbbra is fennált az egyoldalú kitelepítés veszélye:
During the talks between Ferenc Nagy and Stalin in the middle of April 1946, Stalin also held up the examples of the Ukrainian-Polish and Latvian-Polish population transfers to Ferenc Nagy, and declared that parity did not necessarily have to play a role in exchanges. However, he stated that the demand for minority rights for theHungarians in Slovakia was a just one, and promised to support it.[88: Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. 407-19.]
A felvidéki magyar kommunistákat Rákosi arra biztatta, forduljanak panaszaikkal egyenesen Sztálinhoz:
As the talks were being held, Rakosi attempted to influence Stalin further by forwarding a request for help by Hungarian communists from Slovakia to Stalin, who complained specifically about persecution at the hand of Slovak communists.[89: PIL 274.7/309, 114—16.]
1946. május 22-én Rákosi beszédében hevesen bírálta a csehszlovák kormány politikáját:
Rakosi also showed he had followed Stalin's advice. On 22 May, Rakosi strongly criticized the Czechoslovak government in his Bekescsaba speech. He denounced Benes's description of the
population transfer as a 'victory' and condemned the Czechoslovak treatment of Hungarians, the lack of Hungarian newspapers, education, and political organizations, as 'in no way compatible with a democratic state'.[90: Cited inRakosi, Visszaemlékezések i. 271]
A felvidéki magyarok kényszermunkára való deportálása Csehországba ( 1946 nov.-1947 feb.)
Az áttelpítésen kívül, ill. annak fellendítése érdekében 1946 novembere és 1947 januárja között a csehszlovák hatóságok több mint tíz ezer magyar családot deportáltak kényszermunkára Csehországba. Ingatlanjaikat szlovák kolonistáknak utalták ki:
Besides using the population exchange, the Czechoslovak government employed other means to solve its Hungarian problem which caused resentment in Hungary. From the autumn of 1945, it started with the forced labour of Hungarian men from Slovakia to repair war damage in the
Bohemian lands. In sometimes violent actions Hungarian men were arrested and transported to Bohemia[91: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 22—4.]
From the summer of 1946, the voluntary labour of Hungarians in Bohemia and Moravia commenced, but the Czechoslovak authorities foiled to recruit significant numbers of Hungarian workers. Following a secret decree in November 1946, Hungarians from the southern districts of Slovakia could be forcibly employed in Bohemia and Moravia. Between November 1946 and February 1947, 11,568 families (or 43,546 persons) were transported to
the Czech lands.[92: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 54-5.]
At the same time, a movement was started to colonize land left by Hungarians in the Slovak border districts with Czechs and Slovaks from around the country. The Czechoslovak communist Minister of the Interior, Vaclav Nosek, boasted the resettlement of the former Hungarian land was '90 per cent the work of the communists' and 'a truly
revolutionarv feat'.[93: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 200.]
A Reszlovakizáció
Egy további modalitása a csehszlovákiai magyarok szétszórásának a reszlovakizációs kampány volt:
To facilitate the creation of an ethnically pure Slav state, the Czechoslovak government commenced a policy of 'reslovakization'. Czechs and Slovaks, assimilated in the past by Germans and Hungarians, now had to be led back to their Slavic origins. The communist party strongly supported the 'bringing to the surface of those of Slavic origin from the Hungarian masses'.[94: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 322]
The Slovak ideologues of Slovakization went even further, and condemned the ethnic policies of the 1920s and 1930s as too liberal, for not propagating the Slovakization of the borderland. The reslovakization was treated confidentially and as a purely domestic affair, to avoid condemnation from abroad. [95: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 322]
The concept of Slovak was ethnic in character, as the government specifically stated, 'there can be Slovaks, who do not know the Slovak language'.[96: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 325.]
Magyarized Slovaks were invited to report to Reslovakization Committees where their claims to Slovak origins were checked. As propaganda promised Czechoslovak citizenship and exemption from the population transfer there were strong incentives to claim Slovak origins,[97: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 328.] but a mere statistical reslovakization was not deemed adequate. The 352,038 individuals who asked to be reslovakized were also expected to be re-educated in Slovak language and culture.[98: Vadkerty, Kitelepitestol a reszlovakizacioig, 348, 388-94.]
A folytatódó lakosságcsere, kényszermunka és reszlovakizáció fokozott nyomást gyakorolt a magyar kommunista vezetésre:
Population exchange, forced labour, and reslovakization kept putting the MIKP under pressure throughout 1946 and 1947. Additional problems were caused because the citizenship of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia had been revoked in 1945, creating a large stateless minority in the country. Likewise, minority rights were not respected. Hungarians were forbidden
education in their own language, Hungarian publications were not permitted, and frequently vigilantes acted violently against people speaking Hungarian in the street. Resentment built up in the MKP itself against the Slovaks. A party secretary in Maglod had been overheard calling the Hungarian Slovaks 'traitorous scoundrels and a rabble'. [102: PIL 274.10/52, 16.]
A Rákosi vezetés minden eröfeszítése eredménytelennek bizonyult:
The MKP's Foreign Affairs Committee (Kiiliigyi Bizottsag, KB) concluded on 3 February 1947: 'With regard to Czechoslovakia we have to establish that our policy so far has been without result. We have to think about its possible revision.' [104: PIL 274.10/1,4.]
A Párizsi béketárgyalások 1946. július 29. és 1947. február 10. között folytak. Magyarország számára Csehszlovákia vonatkozásában 5 Pozsony-környéki határmenti település átadását jelentették, a magyarok egyirányú deportációját azonban a békekonferencia nem hagyta jóvá.
A két ország kommunista pártjai között 1946 februárja és 1947 júliusa között nem volt kétoldalú kapcsolat...
Mevius, Martin. Agents of Moscow : The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953.
Oxford, GBR: Oxford University Press, UK, 2005. p 49.
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